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Colombia’s Political Past and the Future of the Peace Process

It may seem surprising to the international community that Colombians rejected a plebiscite favoring the implementation of the peace accords with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Although the polls suggested that the “Yes” would win over the “No”, the systemic violence that exists in the country goes beyond the internal conflict with multiple guerrilla groups. After all, the political polarization between President Juan Manuel Santos’ Social Party of National Unity and former President Alvaro Uribe’s Democratic Center was perhaps the main reason why the plebiscite failed. Voters in favor of the “Yes” and Santos’ government undermined that Uribe’s political apparatus remains very strong and politically active.

Alvaro Uribe was elected President in 2002 with 54 percent of the vote in the first round, after basing his platform on the premises that a military campaign would put an end to the FARC. At the time, Colombians were dissatisfied with the way Andres Pastrana’s government had handled the peace talks. They thought the FARC had deceived them into believing that the almost forty-year old conflict at the time was going to end, but the peace talks failed and the FARC had used the opportunity to consolidate and strengthen.

To eradicate all terrorist threats posed by FARC, Uribe boosted the State’s security forces and expanded the Government’s control over the country through what he named the “democratic security” policies. The implementation of the Plan Colombia, a US sponsored military and diplomatic initiative, started tackling two separate conflicts: the war on drugs and the war against the guerrillas. Uribe managed to capitalize an anti-guerrilla sentiment through the coordination of the Colombian Armed Forces and the Police, the demoralization of the guerrilla, the implementation of Plan Colombia, the direct attack to drug trafficking routes, and the fumigation of coca leaf plantations. As a result, on May 2005, Colombia’s Congress authorized President Uribe’s reelection. Alvaro Uribe became the first President in Colombian history to be re-elected. However, the advances made against the FARC stagnated between 2005 and 2010.

Uribe’s quick and verifiable results were problematic. His crusade against the FARC would yield “false positives”, where the military committed human rights abuses by killing innocent people and reporting their deaths as guerrilleros killed in combat. Uribe also signed the Justice and Peace Law in 2005 with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). When the paramilitary started making their declarations at the Justice and Peace hearings, it became clear that they had managed to infiltrate the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of the government, known as the “parapolitics” scandal. This revealed that the paramilitary managed to help elect up to 35 percent of Congress by coercing entire rural populations to vote for a particular candidate in order to receive political favors in exchange. Members of Congress, Governors, military leaders, ministers, and the Director of the Intelligence Agency were linked to the paramilitary. The Justice and Peace Law promoted impunity, and up till now, only around 10 percent of AUC fighters have been convicted.

During his second presidency, Uribe did not manage to amend the Constitution to allow for a third term, but his former Minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos, was elected to be the next President. Although Santos was chosen as the successor of Uribe’s political strategy, he decided to appoint many of Uribe’s “political enemies” and establish relations with Venezuela. Santos deviated from his predecessor’s policies and started conversations with the FARC to begin the ongoing peace talks of Havana. These were a clear offense of Uribe’s military campaign against the FARC and as a result, were seen as a challenge to his political hegemony.

Uribe has firmly criticized the peace process with the FARC, stating that the terms of the agreement are flawed and too lenient. Although the government invited him to join the negotiation table in Havana, he refused to do so multiple times. His party campaigned for the “No” vote during the recent referendum, which included scandals such as the dissemination of false information on social media that circulated deceptive and distorted stories on the content of the agreements.

After the results of the plebiscite were published, Uribe decided to meet with President Santos and selected his own political envoys to send to Havana. He also revealed a set of amendments to reform the current peace agreement. These include amnesty for rank-and-file guerillas, which has already been agreed upon, and tougher sanctions for those engaged in drug trafficking.

There is hope for the biggest political factions to come together and end the current polarization of the country to amend the peace agreement and start its implementation. In order to do so, all the political coalitions have to acknowledge the plebiscite results, which has been the most tangible indicator of the political division the country faces. On one hand, the Government and the FARC have to recognize that half of the country is not satisfied with the current peace agreements. At the same time, Uribe’s coalition needs to realize that the areas that have been most affected by the conflict voted in favor of the peace agreements.

The political panorama in Colombia might look despondent, yet there are plenty of lessons and opportunities to be embraced from the results of the plebiscite. The Government, the FARC, and the Uribistas have to realize that their constant struggle for power affects the lives of thousands of people through the plausible prolongation of a violent conflict. Simultaneously, the promise of peace has made Colombians realize that there could be an end to the conflict. Despite all the differences that may arise from the content of the peace agreements, people want the war to end. As stated by Cynthia Arnson from The Wilson Center, “Peace accords are not panaceas, but rather, a new set of opportunities that can be seized or squandered”. The efforts made during the past four years should not be in vain. As the selection to grant President Juan Manuel Santos the Nobel Peace Prize for 2016 shows, the Colombian peace process has become a global issue and a symbol of hope for future conflicts.

All parties should seize the opportunity to engage in active dialogue in order to create new accords and build a more equal Colombia. The stakes are high, and the negotiation table in Havana has to remember that a 52-year-old conflict cannot be solved without compromising. After all, the Colombian people dream of the day they can exclaim that the war with the FARC is finally over.

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